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Abstract 
Psychological states side by side with the bounded rational expectations among social agents 
contributes to the pattern of consumptions in economic system. One of the psychological states are 
the envy – a tendency to emulate any gaps with other agents’ properties. The evolutionary game 
theoretic works on conspicuous consumption are explored by growing the micro-view of economic 
agency in lattice-based populations, the landscape of consumptions. The emerged macro-view of 
multiple equilibria is shown in computational simulative demonstrations altogether with the spatial 
clustered agents based upon the emerged agents’ economic profiles.  
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Envy is ever joined with the comparing of a man's self;  
and where there is no comparison, no envy! 
F. Bacon, Sr. 
 
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife;  
thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, nor his field ...  
nor anything that is thy neighbor's. 
the 10th rule in ten commandments 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There have been broad recent understandings on human economic behaviors outside economic 
discourses. Economic decisions are always becoming one of the most complex things in economic 
discussions. One of them is the way we choose our pattern of consumption. It has been a common 
understanding that the pattern of consumption is strongly related to the social and economic status. 
A lot of things are being marketed not only for the functionality or degree of necessity solely, but 
also related to the profile beneficiaries. Most luxurious stuffs are placed in the market as a sort of 
conspicuous consumption. They are being sold and bought for the need of good reputation, 
pecuniary strength and good name of buyers, or social leisure of having more than others. This is 
directly reflected in our daily urban and highly organized industrial society [19], from the type of 
cellular phones, dressings, style and brand, even place of lunch and recreation to the luxurious home 
living and daily vehicles.  
 
While income is an important measure for social class, the pattern of consumption is the way to 
show other people conspicuously the represented social class.  A good and unleashed description of 
the relatedness of between consumption is described in [18]. A lot of things are thus, bought in 
order to be shown to others. Furthermore, research surveys have also confirmed how social 
stratification correlated to the cultural consumption [2].  
 
Nonetheless, those are economic phenomena since it has been directly related to the concavity of 
the supply and demand curves for particular products in the market, but yet, it is also related to a 
deep emotional and psychological trait of human species, envy. This is related an interesting field 
related to behavior economics. Inequality has been understood to be one of source of unhappiness 
among people (cf. [7]). Furthermore, the interesting relations between inequality with  the state of 
well-being or happiness are related to the emotional states of human being. As it has been noted in 
[13], emotions serves an adaptive role in helping organisms deal with key survival issues posed by 
the environment. Emotional based decision making among economic agents might have been one of 
explanation to the deviation of rationality in the sense of conventional understanding (cf. [10]), 
beside the realizations on the social boundedness on which rational choices must be taken ([16] & 
[9]).  
 
Recent economic discussions have introduced a lot of interesting discourses related to this. The 
evolutionary game theory as harmonious mixtures between biological studies, economic behavior, 
and mathematical theories on games [17] has outlined some applications into the recent problems 
in economics [5]. One of interesting points are related to the formalizations of the social pattern 
regarding to the game of the conspicuous consumption [4]. The discourse of the evolutionary game 
theoretic analysis on economic issues, the emotional based economic decision making as well as the 
boundedly rational agent based model employment in computational analysis are those becoming 
main issues motivated the paper.  
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The paper is begun with the discussions related to the overview of the mathematical models related 
to the conspicuous consumptions. Most development of the model has been explored in the fashion 
of analytically evolutionary game theoretic models. Discussions are continued to the implementation 
of the models for wider theoretical explorations by incorporating the acquisitions of computational 
simulations. By the end of the paper, some demonstrations of the toy model are presented with 
some outlines to some conjectures in further development.  
 
 
2. Overview of the Model 
The presentation of the paper shows lattice-based populations as landscapes reflecting the 
allocations of ordinary and conspicuous expenses by economic agents. As described in [8], the lattice 
based populations, or more generally the neighborhood structure usually “tends to favor the long-
term co-existence of strategies which would not co-exist in well-mixed populations”. This is the 
dynamics as once introduced in [1, 6] and thus implemented in cultural dissemination model [12], 
and also used as model to discover some dynamical characteristics in corruption [14]. The platform 
is particular kinds of agent based model [11] in which we utilize as computational experiments 
media. Another similar previous work related to advertising could also worth for mention [15]. 
 
Imagine a landscape where people are represented on lattices and grids. Each agent is given the 
same amount of money, and it is on their decision to allocate an (0,1]x =  amount of the money for 
ordinary necessities. While the savings and investments are neglected, the 1 x-  fraction of the 
money is thus allocated for luxurious expenditures. The later expense is thus becoming the source of 
envy among economic agents, things that influence their apprehension on their surroundings and 
thus give impact to their decision making. Thus, the expected pay off on each round of the game 
thus depends on each agent’s ordinary consumption ( u ) and her allocation of for the conspicuous 
consumption (U ),  
 
U cuj = +         (1) 
 
where 0c ³  denotes the constant marginal rate substitution. The ordinary consumption can be 
stated as a concave utility function,  
 
lncu c x= ,        (2) 
 
and as 0x ®  we have j ® -¥  reflecting the importance of the ordinary consumption, while the 
utility function due to ordinary expenses would be ( ,0]cu Î -¥  - a fact that no one will completely 
neglects the ordinary consumption expect for the limiting case of 0c = .  
 
The main of the focus in the game is thus the conspicuous consumption: how much is the fraction 
needed to satisfy the social effect of envy when other surrounding people have more (or less) 
fraction for the conspicuous expenses. An evolutionary modeling of this has been analytically 
analyzed by the calculating the gradient dynamics in the fashion of cumulative distribution of 
function [4].  
 
Our approach in the paper is related to the implementation of the models showing the economic 
behavior as pointed out in [19] as consumptions of the excellent goods that is socially related to the 
evidence of wealth. In this game, if an economic agent compare her allocated expenses for excellent 
goods is bigger than other, she would be in the psychological state of envy – a thing that motivates 
her to allocate bigger consumption if they interact again in the future. This envy however must be 
constrained due to her allocation of ordinary consumption which is a necessity and cannot be 
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nullified. Here, when an agent allocates a fraction of x  to the ordinary consumption (thus allocate a 
fraction of (1 )x-  for conspicuous one) and find out that other agent that interacts with her pay the 
fraction of y x<  for the same respective expenditures (thus (1 )y- for excellent goods), then she 
will have disutility in the proportion of  
 
( , ) min{0, ( )}r x y y x= -       (3) 
In the analytical model as proposed by [4], the payoff  can be written,  
 
1
0 0 0
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
x x
U x D r x y dD y y x dD y D y dy= = - = -ò ò ò   (4) 
 
where ( )D y  is the cumulative  distribution  function of other’s decision on the fraction to the 
ordinary consumption and give us a consequence to the total payoff of an agent, 
 
0
( , ) ln ( )
x
x D c x D y dyj = - ò .      (5) 
 
It is easy to see that that in the limiting case
0
( ) 0
x
D y dy =ò , a corresponding agent that allocates 
sufficiently small amount of x  for ordinary consumption gets the maximum payoff related to her 
envy to others. The gradient dynamics, on which agents adjust the value of x  is. 
 
( )x
c D x
x x
j
j
¶
= -
¶
@         (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The landscape of allocation for ordinary consumption  
after the rule of envy is implemented for T=250  rounds 
 
 
 
3. Experiments with spatially-bounded agents 
A numerical simulations is conducted in [5] in order to see the possible stable equilibria of the 
problems by a discretization of equation (5) in such a way, 
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1 1
1ln ln
N N
i i
i i
c x F x c x F
N
j
= =
= - D = -å å     (7) 
 
With the gradient as analytically shown in eq. (6),  
 
n n
n
c F
x
j = -         (8) 
 
where iF  denotes the cumulative distribution function obtained from the numerical integration of 
the probability measure if  in the i -th  interval among  
 
1
N
i i
k
F f x
=
= Då         (9) 
 
as  if  is the average density of M number consumers with strategies divided in xD equal N  
number of intervals, as to 
1x
N
D = . Consequently, we have 0( ) 0F x =  and ( ) 1NF x = , a sort of 
rank among whole agents – from which the name rank dependent consumption came from.  
 
When the focus of our attention is the multiple equilibria, this approach has given interesting 
results. Yet, another perspective can also be offered related to the economic agent’s boundedness 
related to the conspicuous consumption. In reality, the people are “trapped” in social surroundings 
in which envy and vanity is sourced upon cognitively. People do not have to compare his 
expenditures with those he would only “meet” on television, but people that are socially related to 
them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Different average equilibra at different values of c. 
 
 Thus, we transform the discretization as suggested in eq. (7) into 
cells or square lattice
view is more like a torus
the right grids with the left one
neighborhood (with connections between nearest and next
total neighbors, 
the set of 
as, 
 
( , , ) ln ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , )i j t c x i j t x i j t x i j tj
 
where 
neighbors, indexed as 
 
On any 
 
( , , 1)x i j t
 
 
where 
consumption. Thus, an agent would stay with the same fraction of ordinary consumption if her 
payoff is larger than the average payoff of her neighbors and change her decision into the averag
her neighbors’ decisions for ordinary consumption otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strateg
= + -
Nx u  is the decision of neighbors for ordinary consumption and 
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(0, ]Î ¥
] 1
Nl
å
{1,2,...,8}u =
) j j
N Nu u
Nu
 is the average of the average decision of neighbors for ordinary 
Figure 
.  The myopic agents evaluate their payoffs in the 
and as an adaptation of eq. (1), (3) and (4), we can write the pay off 
u
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 4. Computational Experiments
From the model, we can do computational experiments that would reveal the unique equilibria 
among agents due to their allocations of ordinary and conspicuous consumptions. Our simulation is 
conducted in square lattices of 
simulative process is shown in figure 1: the initial random condition of allocation to ordinary 
consumption and thus after rounds of simulation stay at equilibria when age
strategies for more. The not
average allocation of ordinary consumption as shown in figure 2 for various value of marginal rate 
substitution (
consumption should be allocated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of interesting thing that we can learn from our simulation is the emergence of spatially located 
social classes. It is worth to note
intervals in which agents stop changing their allocation for ordinary consumption. One of the 
for c
equilibrium point near the value of the average as some less agents are keeping their status as the 
higher and lower profile agents. Thus, the equilibria is show
 
Interestingly, this can also be visualized as the clustered agents spatially as shown in figure 4. At the 
end of rounds of simulation, it is obvious that there are some clustered agents to be in the state of 
higher allocatio
agents), while most of agents are in the state of medium class of ordinary consumption. This has 
become a unique property that we could have gained from the computatio
c
0.1=  is shown in figure 3. However, it is interesting to see that most of agents are finding their 
). It is clear that the higher the value of 
Figure 4. The 
n for ordinary consumption (
 
-changing states reflect the equilibrium and can be seen on the constant 
emergence of social class
30L =
 
shows
 that the average value as shown in figure 2 came from a sort of 
 for T
 the high, low profile agents.
i.e.: 
250=  rounds of games with variable
c
: the allocation for ordinary consumption 
lower profile agents), lower one (
, the more fraction of income to ordinary 
 
n to be in a kind of interval.
nts do not change their 
i.e.: 
nal agent
Clusters of 
Clusters of 
c =
 
 
higher profile 
-based model 
lower
higher profile
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results 
 profile
 
 
 from the model as introduced in eq. (5) and (6). From the big picture, there has been an emergence 
of economic classes based due to their profile in their allocation to ordinary and luxurious 
consumption in the state of multiple equil
and lower profile agents among the sea of average profile persons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From our simulation, we could also observe some interesting aspects spatially. Some agents are 
lucky enough that they have already close enough to the equilibria when the random initializations 
are set or at least they have neighbors with such allocations of ordinary consumption. Those have 
accumulated payoff relatively higher than the others. Figure 5 shows this in our landscape of 
consumptions. Obviously, the emergent spatial patterns are shown he
locations filled with such lucky agents. Rounds by rounds in our simulations they accumulate payoffs 
in such ways emerging the spatially clustered agents whose relatively higher payoffs at the end of 
our simulations. Those age
accumulated payoffs there would be such gradation. This reflects the diffusions of strategies 
throughout the spatial landscape related to the optimum and best fraction of ordinary consum
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
among agents
Figure 5. 
Figure 
 throughout the computational simulation.
high pay off
low pay off
The landscape of 
are filled with agents whose higher accumulated payoff
nts are clustered one another and to the clustered agents whose lower 
6. The 
 
 
payoff after
equilibrium points as the attractors 
ibria: there are “islands” representing the higher profile 
 T=250  rounds: the darker the 
based on envy 
 The interval of the equilibria is shown.
 
s
re. In the figure, darker red 
red cells 
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However, the process of the diffusions along the rounds of our computational simulations can be 
seen vaguely in the phase map corresponding to the mapping of ( ) ( 1)x t x t® + . This is shown in 
the figure 6.The random initialization has been attracted to the intervals of equilibria. This is a sort of 
attractor of envy. Whatever the initial strategies, they will always be attracted to the intervals as 
shown in figure 3, and the equilibrium strategy decided by agents are thus related directly to their 
respective spatial positions i.e.:  in what kind of neighborhood she is placed upon. Thus we have 
demonstrated that the evolutionary processes do not only depend upon the strategies that are 
being used in the games but also the respective positions of the strategic occupants.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have shown the discussions incorporating the computational agent based models of the game 
on allocating ordinary and conspicuous consumptions among economic agents. While the task came 
from one of the proxy of the evolutionary (economics) game theory, the presentation is based on an 
implemented fashion of computational simulations. The latter has been enriched the works on the 
boundedness of agents due to the myopic evaluations of agents on their neighborhood and some 
spatially emerged facts while macro-view equilibria have been reached over rounds of simulations. 
An interesting result is shown related to the varying, yet clustered populations and an attractor of 
envy on the landscape of allocations between ordinary and conspicuous consumption. While the size 
of the allocation for conspicuous consumption is related to the economic profile of agents, it is also 
visually shown in 2-dimensional lattices the emergence of higher, lower, as well as medium classes 
of economic profiles.  
 
While in general the model depicts how emotional state – in this case, envy – could become a source 
of the concavity of the demand function, the promising future works could be conjectured to see 
how evolutionary game theory can be explored for other factors and variables used by agents, e.g. 
the development of economic discourse based on psychological behaviors, evolutionary paradigms 
on multiple equilibria, as well as computer simulations as toy models. The further works on this 
research inquiries would also be conjectured to the recognition of psychological aspects e.g. 
happiness or well-being-ness, to the emerging macro-pattern of economic decisions. This is left for 
future work.  
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
Author thanks Surya Research International for the provision of financial support in which period the 
paper is written. All fault remains author’s. 
 
 
Works Cited  
[1] Axelrod, R. (1997). "The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global 
Polarization". The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (2): 203-26. Sage. 
[2] Chan, T. W. & Goldthorpe, J. H. (2007). "The Social Stratification of Cultural Consumption: Some Policy 
Implications of a Research Project". Cultural Trends 16 (4): 373-84. Routledge. 
[3] Friedman, D. (1998). “On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory”.  Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics 8: 15-43. Springer-Verlag. 
[4] Friedman, D. & Yellin, J. (2000). “Castles in Tuscany: The Dynamics of Rank Dependent Consumption”. 
UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 455.  
[5] Friedman, D. & Abraham, R. (2004). “Landscape Dynamics and Conspicuous Consumption”. Paper 
presented at the 2004 Proceedings of the Society for Dynamic Games. URL: 
http://www.vismath.org/research/landscapedyn/articles/Tucson4.pdf 
[6] Gilbert, N. & Terna, P. (2000). “How to build and use agent-based models in social science”. Mind & 
Society 1 (1): 57-72. Springer. 
10 
 
[7] Graham, C. & Felton, A. (2006). "Inequality and Happiness: Insights from Latin America". Journal of 
Economic Inequality 4: 107-22. Springer. 
[8] Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. "Evolutionary Game Dynamics". Bulletin of the American Mathematical 
Society 40 (4): 479-519. AMS. 
[9] Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: psychology for behavioral economics. The 
American Economic Review. 93(5). pp. 1449–1475. American Economic Association. 
[10] Kirman, A., Livet, P., Teschl, M. (2010). "Rationality and Emotions". Philosophical Transactions of The 
Royal Society B 365: 215-9. The Royal Society. 
[11] Macy, M.W., & Willer, R. (2002). “From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent Based 
Modeling. Annual Reviews Sociology 28: 143-66. Annual Reviews. 
[12] Parravano, A., Rivera-Ramirez, H., & Cosenza, M. G. (2006). "Intracultural Diversity in a Model of 
Social Dynamics". Physica A 379 (1): 241-9. Elsevier. 
[13] Plutchik, R. (1980). Emotion: A psycho-evolutionary synthesis. Harper & Row. 
[14] Situngkir, H. (2003). “Moneyscape: a generic agent-based model of corruption”. BFI Working Paper 
Series WPD2003. Bandung Fe Institute. 
[15] Situngkir, H. (2006). “Advertising in Duopoly Market”. BFI Working Paper Series WPF2006. Bandung Fe 
Institute. 
[16] Simon, H. (1990). “A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism”. Science 250 (4988): 
1665-8. AAAS. 
[17] Smith, J. M. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press 
[18] Solomon, M., Bamossy, G., Askegaard, S., & Hogg, M. K. (1999). Consumer Behavior: A European 
Perspective 3rd ed. Prentice Hall. 
[19] Veblen, T. (1898). The Theory of the Leisure Class. Macmillan.  
